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ATKINS V. VIRGINIA:
LOOKING BACK AND LOOKING FORWARD
Shay-Ann Heiser Singh*
In Atkins v. Virginia, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the execu-
tion of offenders with mental retardation was unconstitutional under
the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment.1 The
Court found an emerging national consensus against the practice, but
left to the states the work of "determining which offenders are in fact
retarded" and "developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitu-
tional restriction."' 2 Five years after that landmark opinion, the Sev-
enteenth Annual DePaul Law Review Symposium gathered a group
of scholars and practitioners to reflect upon the Atkins decision, re-
view the work of the states and of capital juries since Atkins, and iden-
tify the most significant challenges in applying the decision.
In his keynote address reproduced in this issue, Bill Kurtis, an ac-
claimed journalist and author of The Death Penalty on Trial: Crisis in
American Justice, recalled hearing former Illinois Governor George
Ryan pardon four death row inmates just a few days before the end of
his last term.3 Kurtis described the sense of betrayal that motivated
Ryan to grant the pardons and ultimately to commute the sentences of
everyone on Illinois's death row. He poignantly noted how common
sense and the most basic and indisputable statistics about the capital
justice system in Illinois and in other parts of the country lead to just
one conclusion: many of those sentenced to death have been short-
changed by a system that is broken and that may not have ever func-
tioned "correctly." Kurtis also described his own investigation of two
wrongful convictions, which revealed a few of the myriad mistakes
that can lead to the conviction and execution of innocent defendants.
Kurtis's investigation and this country's recent experience with nu-
merous DNA exonerations have demonstrated that there is not just
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one route to wrongful conviction and execution.4 Rather, there is a
narrow path to acquittal for innocent defendants with a multitude of
potentially deadly hazards and detours along the way. Navigating a
capital trial, then, is necessarily less likely to result in a just outcome
for defendants with mental retardation, given that "some characteris-
tics of [the disability may] undermine the strength of the procedural
protections that our capital jurisprudence steadfastly guards."5
Additionally, Professor James Ellis, who represented Daryl Renard
Atkins in front of the U.S. Supreme Court, traces changes in the
Court's understanding of mental retardation and its perception of in-
dividuals suffering from the disability. 6 In the decades following Buck
v. Bell, scholars and practitioners largely rejected the Court's charac-
terization of individuals with mental retardation as a drain on society
and prone to criminal activity, as experts on mental retardation made
great strides in understanding the disability and became more vocal
about the treatment of individuals with mental retardation. But the
Court's own perception of mental retardation remained stagnant,
fixed in its Buck decision for nearly fifty years, until the 1970s and
early 1980s, when a targeted litigation campaign began to make in-
roads in protecting the liberty interests of those with mental retarda-
tion. Ellis argues that, rather than evolving gradually, the Court's
understanding of mental retardation has moved forward in fits and
starts, case by case, with Atkins marking the most recent significant
change. His article serves as a reminder that, if we are to improve our
capital justice system and reduce the number of innocent and unde-
serving defendants ensnared in it, we must be diligent and persistent
in educating the Court about the problems that exist in the system.
Next, Professor Ajitha Reddy's article delves into the origins of IQ
testing, originally developed to identify French children in need of ex-
tra help at school but co-opted and redesigned by American
eugenicists for use with adults. 7 Reddy argues that the Court's partial
reliance on IQ testing to demonstrate mental retardation and conse-
quent reduced personal culpability is inequitable, not only because the
test lacks basic validity in measuring intelligence and innate ability,
but also because there is no constitutional impediment to executing
capital offenders who similarly lack personal culpability by reason of
other disabilities.
4. See The Innocence Project, http://innocenceproject.org (last visited Feb. 6, 2008).
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Professor Maria Sandys's article shifts the focus to respond to sev-
eral objections raised by former Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Scalia in their dissents in Atkins.8 First, Sandys argues that Atkins is
unlikely to engender the onslaught of mental retardation claims and
Atkins-based habeas petitions feared by Justice Scalia. To illustrate
this point, Sandys uses seven capital cases brought in Indiana before
Atkins but after the state legislature passed an Atkins-like statute
making capital defendants with mental retardation ineligible for the
death penalty.
Second, Sandys notes that Rehnquist objected to the Court's find-
ing of an "emerging consensus" on this issue. Rehnquist disagreed
with the majority, because there was no evidence that juries consider
death an inappropriate sentence for capital offenders with mental re-
tardation. Sandys presents original data collected by the Capital Jury
Project (CJP) that suggest that capital jurors, in fact, do not routinely
avoid sentencing offenders with mental retardation to death, in part
because they cannot agree on which offenders are mentally retarded.
In addition, Sandys summarizes CJP data showing that capital jurors
misunderstand the characteristic features of mental retardation, par-
ticularly mild mental retardation, and that, even when presented with
expert testimony on the issue, jurors may rely on inaccurate stereo-
types and unrepresentative personal experiences to assess whether
capital defendants are mentally retarded. Finally, Sandys points to
CJP data as an indication that Atkins alone cannot ensure that no of-
fender with mental retardation will be sentenced to death, and she
advises attorneys representing capital defendants with mental retarda-
tion post-Atkins to use voir dire to aggressively explore prospective
jurors' understanding of mental retardation and their experiences with
individuals suffering from the disability.
Similarly, Professor Andrea Lyon notes Atkins's failure to ensure
that offenders with mental retardation are not sentenced to death in
the United States.9 Lyon describes the special challenges that arise in
representing such clients post-Atkins and offers practical advice for
selecting a jury that will give appropriate consideration to the client's
mental retardation as a mitigating factor. In particular, Lyon urges
capital defense attorneys to use jury questionnaires and fight for attor-
ney-conducted and individual, sequestered voir dire, particularly when
evidence of mental retardation will be presented. She notes that such
8. Maria Sandys, Adam Trahan & Heather Pruss, Taking Account of the "Diminished Capaci-
ties of the Retarded": Are Capital Jurors up to the Task?, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 679 (2008).
9. Andrea D. Lyon, But He Doesn't Look Retarded: Capital Jury Selection for the Mentally
Retarded Client Not Excluded After Atkins v. Virginia, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 701 (2008).
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measures provide jurors with a more comfortable way to disclose so-
cially undesirable perspectives and, consequently, enhance capital de-
fenders' abilities to discover the information necessary to select juries
that will not choose the death penalty for their clients.
Next, Professors Carol Steiker and Jordan Steiker explore the un-
derbelly of the Court's return to substantive regulation of the death
penalty in the Atkins and Simmons 1° decisions and explain how the
absence of procedural components in those decisions risks legitima-
tion of a capital justice system that remains inequitable at its core."
The Steikers point to the Court's decision last term in Panetti12 as a
roadmap for challenging the worst procedural barriers to full imple-
mentation of Atkins's substantive ban. Finally, and perhaps most im-
portantly, the Steikers argue that the Court's broad-armed embrace of
sources other than state legislation and actual jury verdicts in assess-
ing "evolving standards of decency" may suggest new strategies for
pursuing abolition of the death penalty.
Finally, in his remarks, Bryan Stevenson cautioned that Atkins is
not a w atershed for those with mental retardation who most fre-
quently become entangled in the capital justice system: the extremely
poor. Atkins requires the manifestation and diagnosis of mental retar-
dation before the age of eighteen, but many indigent capital defend-
ants had little or no access to medical care as children or, if they did
have access, were not properly diagnosed because of environmental
and cultural issues. As a result, while Atkins prevents the execution of
some with mental retardation, it does little for many capital offenders
suffering from the disability. Stevenson encouraged us to act on At-
kins in a more personal way, reminding us that we all have the power
to change how our society thinks about capital clients and about indi-
viduals with mental retardation, if only by talking about these issues
with the persons closest to us. 13
The articles that follow provide an in-depth exploration of Atkins's
history and its future, its successes and its shortcomings, and they
make clear that the battle for a just and equitable death penalty-or
no death penalty at all-must wage on.
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